

HISTORICAL CRISIS COMMITTEE

Background Guide

Freeze Date: 14th May 1948

EXECUTIVE BOARD

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Letter from the Executive Board

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to this Historical Crisis Committee. We are delighted to have each of you join us for what we hope will be an engaging, fast-paced, and thought-provoking simulation of one of the most volatile periods of the twentieth century.

Before you proceed any further, we want to be upfront about the purpose and limitations of this document. This Background Guide is meant to serve as a starting point and a foundation for your independent research. It is not, and should not be treated as, a complete or exhaustive account of the events, actors, or circumstances that define this crisis. Nor should anything contained within this guide be cited or used as 'proof' of any fact within committee. We strongly encourage every delegate to go beyond this document, read primary sources where possible, and develop a far deeper understanding of their assigned nation and the world of 1948 than what these pages can offer.

With that said, we hope this guide gives you a useful map of the terrain you are about to enter a world emerging from one war and sliding, almost imperceptibly, into another. Read carefully, come prepared, and above all, come curious.

We look forward to seeing the history you make.

Warm regards,

Ayaan Khan & Maitreya

Executive Board

What is a Crisis Committee?

A Crisis Committee is a specialised form of Model United Nations simulation designed to be fast-paced, dynamic, and reactive. Unlike traditional General Assembly-style committees, where debate revolves around drafting and passing resolutions over the course of several days, a Crisis Committee places delegates inside a specific, high-stakes historical or hypothetical moment and asks them to respond to it in real time.

In a Crisis Committee, delegates typically represent individuals — heads of state, foreign ministers, military commanders, intelligence chiefs, or other key decision-makers — rather than entire countries in the abstract. This means delegates are bound by the resources, knowledge, personality, and constraints of the specific person and government they portray. Money, troops, intelligence assets, and political capital are finite. Nothing can be conjured out of thin air.

The defining feature of a Crisis Committee is the constant arrival of ‘crisis updates’ — new developments introduced by the Executive Board that shift the situation on the ground. These updates are often the direct result of directives (explained below) submitted by delegates, meaning that the committee’s own actions shape the unfolding narrative. The world delegates start with on the first day will not be the world they end with.

Delegates should expect debate to move quickly, alliances to be tested, and the unexpected to occur often. The best delegates are not necessarily the most vocal, but those who read the situation carefully, anticipate consequences, and act with both conviction and nuance.

The Freeze Date

Every Crisis Committee operates around a ‘freeze date’ — a specific point in history at which the simulation begins. All events up to and including this date are considered to have occurred exactly as they did in reality, and delegates are expected to be familiar with this history. From this date forward, however, history is no longer fixed. It is in the hands of the delegates in the room.

For this committee, the freeze date is **14th May 1948**. Delegates should know everything that occurred in the world up to and including this date, but should treat anything after it as undetermined — to be shaped by the choices made in this room.

14th May 1948 is an extraordinarily significant date. It is the day the British Mandate for Palestine formally lapsed, the day the Jewish state of Israel was proclaimed in Tel Aviv, and the eve of a five-nation Arab invasion that would erupt within hours. But it is also a date suspended in the middle of half a dozen other unresolved global crises — in Germany, in China, in Greece, in the colonial world, and within the fracturing wartime alliance between East and West. This guide will walk delegates through each of these threads as they stood on this single, pivotal day.

Hierarchy of Evidence

Delegates should be aware that, where conflicting information arises during committee, the following hierarchy of evidence will generally apply, in descending order of authority:

1. Crisis Updates issued by the Executive Board
2. Outcomes of Passed Directives
3. Official Communiqués
4. Primary Source Documents (pre-freeze date)
5. Contemporary News Agency Reports
6. Delegate Speeches and In-Committee Statements

Rules of Procedure

This committee follows UNA-USA Rules of Procedure. The following is a guide to the formats of debate, yields, points, and motions that will govern committee proceedings.

I. Formats of Debate

1. General Speakers List (GSL)

The General Speakers List is an ongoing and continuous list that remains open for the duration of committee.

- Delegates may request to be added to the list at any time.
- Speeches under the GSL should focus on policy positions, proposed frameworks, and structured solutions.
- Speaking time for each speaker will be determined by the committee.
- The GSL serves as the backbone of formal debate and resumes whenever no other motion is active.

2. Moderated Caucus

A Moderated Caucus allows focused discussion on a specific sub-topic.

- The Executive Board recognises speakers one by one.
- Maximum duration: 20 minutes.
- Individual speaking time must be specified in the motion and must be divisible by the total time requested.
- A topic must be specified in the motion.

Moderated caucuses are encouraged when delegates wish to narrow discussion to specific issues, such as a particular crisis thread or a specific policy question.

3. Unmoderated Caucus

An Unmoderated Caucus allows delegates to move freely within the committee room to negotiate, draft documents, and consult with other delegations.

- No formal speaker recognition is required.

- Delegates may form blocs and working groups.
- Maximum duration: 20 minutes.
- No topic specification is required in the motion.

This format is strongly encouraged for drafting directives, frameworks, treaties, and joint proposals.

4. Consultations

Consultations are semi-moderated sessions designed to simulate high-level diplomatic negotiations.

- The Executive Board will intervene minimally.
- The committee may collectively determine speaker order and time management.
- Maximum duration: 20 minutes.
- No topic specification is required in the motion.

Consultations are intended for high-stakes political or economic negotiation phases where flexibility and realism are required.

II. Yields

Yielding applies only to speeches delivered under the General Speakers List. If a delegate has time remaining at the end of their speech, they may choose one of the following yield options:

1. Yield to the Executive Board

The remaining time is surrendered to the Executive Board, which will proceed with the next speaker or advance the committee.

2. Yield to Another Delegate

- The delegate must inform the Executive Board in advance of their intention to yield.
- The receiving delegate may use the time as they see fit.
- Yielded time may not be yielded again.

3. Yield to Questions

- Delegates wishing to ask questions will be recognised by the Executive Board.
- Questions must be concise and relevant.
- Follow-up questions are subject to time constraints.

III. Points

1. Point of Information

A question directed at a speaker during their General Speakers List speech, only if the speaker has yielded to questions.

2. Point of Order

Raised when a delegate believes there has been an error in procedure by the Executive Board. This point must refer strictly to procedural matters. It may also be raised against another delegate on matters of factual inaccuracy, at the EB's discretion.

3. Point of Parliamentary Enquiry

A question directed to the Executive Board regarding the rules of procedure or the flow of debate. This may not interrupt a speaker.

4. Point of Personal Privilege

Raised when a delegate experiences personal discomfort or a logistical issue such as inability to hear a speaker, temperature concerns, or the need for writing materials or any issue affecting their ability to participate effectively. This point may interrupt a speaker only if the matter is urgent.

IV. Motions

Motions are used to direct the committee's flow and format of debate. A delegate proposes a motion, it requires a second, and is then put to a vote by the Executive Board.

Motions During Debate

- Motion for a Moderated Caucus: Must include total time, individual speaking time, and topic. Total time must be a maximum of 20 minutes, and individual speaking time must be divisible by the total time. Example: 'The delegate of the Soviet Union moves for a Moderated Caucus of 20 minutes with an individual speaking time of 2 minutes to discuss the situation in Berlin.'
- Motion for an Unmoderated Caucus: Must include total time only, maximum 20 minutes. No topic required. Example: 'The delegate of France moves for an Unmoderated Caucus of 15 minutes.'
- Motion for Consultations: Must include total time only, maximum 20 minutes. No topic required. Example: 'The delegate of the United Kingdom moves for Consultations of 20 minutes.'

Motions to Manage Committee Schedule

- Motion to Recess for Lunch: Used to suspend committee proceedings for a lunch break. Example: 'The delegate of the United States moves to break committee for lunch.'
- Motion to Suspend the Session: Used to formally close proceedings for the day. Example: 'The delegate of India moves to suspend the session for the day.'

All motions are subject to the discretion of the Executive Board. The EB reserves the right to rule any motion out of order if it is deemed disruptive, redundant, or contrary to the smooth functioning of the committee.

Crisis One: Palestine — Independence, Invasion, and the Birth of Israel

I. The Long Road to the Mandate's End

To understand the events converging on Palestine on 14th May 1948, delegates must first appreciate that this is not a sudden crisis but the culmination of three decades of accumulating contradictions, all of which trace back to a single piece of paper: the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. In that declaration, the British Government, then at war and seeking to secure support from Jewish communities and financiers in Europe and America, expressed its support for 'the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people', while simultaneously promising that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities, who at the time constituted roughly ninety percent of the population of Palestine. From its inception, the British position in Palestine was built on a promise that could not be honoured to both parties simultaneously.

When the League of Nations formally awarded Britain the Mandate for Palestine in 1922, the Balfour Declaration's commitments were written into the Mandate's text itself, obligating Britain to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement while administering the territory in the interests of all its inhabitants. For the better part of two decades, Britain attempted to walk this impossible line, adjusting immigration quotas upward and downward in response to pressure from Zionist organisations on one side and Arab nationalist agitation on the other. The Arab Revolt of 1936 to 1939 was the clearest expression of Arab Palestinian frustration with this arrangement: a sustained uprising against both British rule and Jewish immigration, which the British military suppressed with considerable force, but which also led the British Government to issue the 1939 White Paper, sharply curtailing further Jewish immigration just as the situation for Jews in Europe was becoming catastrophic.

The Second World War and the Holocaust transformed the moral and political stakes of the Palestine question beyond recognition. By 1945, the Jewish communities of Europe had been almost entirely destroyed, and the survivors — hundreds of thousands of displaced persons languishing in camps across Europe — increasingly saw Palestine as their only viable destination. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, the recognised representative body of the Jewish community (the Yishuv) under the Mandate, pressed Britain relentlessly to lift the restrictions of the White Paper and admit these refugees. At the same time, the Jewish underground movements in Palestine — chiefly the Haganah (the main paramilitary organisation, broadly aligned with the Jewish Agency), and the more radical Irgun Zeva'i Le'umi and Lehi (the Stern Gang) — escalated a campaign of armed resistance against British forces, culminating in incidents such as the 1946 bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which housed the British military and civilian administration.

By 1947, Britain — financially exhausted by the war, facing a costly and unpopular insurgency in Palestine, and confronting the early signs of decolonisation pressures across its empire — concluded that the Mandate had become unsustainable. In February 1947, the British

Government referred the entire question of Palestine's future to the newly formed United Nations, effectively announcing its intention to withdraw.

II. The Partition Plan and the Descent into Civil War

The United Nations responded by establishing a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which travelled to the region, took testimony from Jewish and Arab representatives (the Arab Higher Committee boycotted the proceedings), and ultimately recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, with the city of Jerusalem and its environs placed under a special international regime administered by the United Nations *a corpus separatum*, owing to its significance to three major religions and the deep attachment both Jewish and Arab communities held to the city.

On 29th November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted this recommendation as Resolution 181, the Partition Plan, by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against, and 10 abstentions. The Jewish Agency, despite reservations about the specific boundaries proposed which would have given the Jewish state a series of disconnected territories linked by narrow corridors accepted the resolution as a basis for proceeding toward statehood. The Arab League and the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine rejected the resolution outright, regarding the partition of Arab-majority territory by an international body in which Arab states had been comprehensively outvoted as fundamentally illegitimate, and declared their intention to resist its implementation by any means necessary.

The adoption of the Partition Resolution did not create two states; it created a countdown to civil war. Within days, violence broke out between Jewish and Arab communities across Palestine, beginning with attacks on Jewish buses and escalating rapidly into a cycle of raids, reprisals, and ambushes that would continue, with mounting intensity, for the following six months. The British administration, having announced its intention to withdraw by 15th May 1948, increasingly disengaged from law-and-order responsibilities, creating a security vacuum that both Jewish and Arab paramilitary forces moved to fill.

The first phase of this civil war, lasting roughly from December 1947 to March 1948, generally favoured the Arab side: local Arab militias, reinforced by volunteers organised into the Arab Liberation Army (raised and equipped with the assistance of neighbouring Arab states and operating with at least the tacit acquiescence of the British authorities in some areas), succeeded in disrupting Jewish transport and supply routes, particularly the road linking Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, placing the roughly 100,000 Jewish residents of Jerusalem under a punishing informal siege. Jewish casualties mounted, and for a period in early 1948 the viability of the entire Jewish settlement project in parts of the country appeared genuinely in doubt.

The turning point came in April 1948, with the Haganah's adoption of Plan Dalet a comprehensive operational plan aimed at securing the territory allotted to the Jewish state under the Partition Plan, securing the corridors connecting Jewish population centres, and neutralising hostile Arab villages and militia concentrations along those corridors and within the projected borders of the Jewish state. The implementation of Plan Dalet through April and early May 1948 produced a dramatic shift in the military balance. Operation Nachshon broke the siege of the Jerusalem road in early April. Major mixed cities Haifa, Jaffa, Safed, and Acre fell under Jewish control in April and early May, in several cases triggering the

flight of large portions of their Arab populations, whether through direct expulsion, fear of violence following events such as the killings at Deir Yassin in early April, or instructions from local Arab leaderships to evacuate temporarily. By the second week of May 1948, the demographic and territorial map of Palestine had been transformed: large areas allotted to the Jewish state under the Partition Plan, and some areas allotted to the Arab state, were now under Jewish control, and a refugee crisis of major proportions — hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs displaced from their homes — was already well underway before a single regular Arab army had crossed the border.

III. The Countdown to 15th May: The Final Days of the Mandate

As the second week of May 1948 unfolds, the British withdrawal from Palestine accelerates toward its conclusion. British forces progressively hand over installations, police stations, and administrative facilities — in many cases to whichever local force, Jewish or Arab, is best positioned to take control of a given area, producing a patchwork of transfers that itself shapes the emerging territorial map. The port city of Haifa, handed over amid fighting in late April, has already seen the bulk of its Arab population depart. In Jerusalem, the Jewish and Arab populations are effectively partitioning the city between themselves even as the international regime envisioned for it under the Partition Plan has never been implemented and shows no prospect of being implemented.

In the days immediately preceding 14th May, Jewish forces conduct further consolidating operations, including efforts to secure Jewish neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and the corridor to the coast, anticipating that the Arab regular armies massing on Palestine's borders will attempt to drive through these very corridors once the Mandate ends. The Jewish Agency leadership, meeting in Tel Aviv, debates intensely — down to the final days — whether and how to declare independence, and on what terms, with the question of whether to specify borders in the declaration (and thereby implicitly accept or reject the Partition Plan's lines) a matter of considerable internal disagreement. The final text of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel deliberately avoids specifying borders, a choice that will have enormous consequences for the territorial outcome of the coming war.

On the Arab side, the leaders of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq — meeting under the auspices of the Arab League — have committed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and considerably divergent strategic motivations, to send their regular armies into Palestine the moment the British Mandate expires. Transjordan's King Abdullah, whose Arab Legion is widely regarded as the most capable Arab military force in the field, has his own ambitions regarding the territory earmarked for the Arab state, particularly the West Bank and East Jerusalem, ambitions that are not fully shared by his nominal Arab allies, several of whom view Abdullah's territorial designs with suspicion. Egypt's decision to commit forces is driven in substantial part by competitive pressure, a concern that if Transjordan acts alone, it will reap the territorial and political rewards of intervention while Egypt is left on the sidelines. This lack of a unified Arab strategic plan, even as armies mobilise, will prove to be one of the defining features of the war about to begin.

On the diplomatic front, the question of recognition looms large. The United States, which has been an uneasy and inconsistent supporter of partition at the United Nations — at one point in March 1948 even floating the idea of a UN trusteeship over Palestine as an alternative to partition, before reversing course — is understood to be on the verge of

extending recognition to the Jewish state the moment it is declared, a decision driven by a combination of domestic political considerations, sympathy for Jewish statehood within the Truman Administration, and a desire not to be seen lagging behind events. The Soviet Union's position is, at this stage, less certain in its specifics but broadly favourable to partition, having been one of its most vocal supporters at the United Nations in November 1947 a position rooted less in any ideological sympathy for Zionism than in a calculation that the end of the British Mandate represents a blow to British imperial power in the Middle East, a region the Soviet Union has long sought greater influence in.

IV. The Military Balance on the Eve of War

As of 14th May 1948, the forces that will shortly be at war present a picture of profound asymmetry in some respects and surprising parity in others a fact that will surprise many observers once the fighting begins in earnest.

The Jewish forces, soon to be formally unified into the Israel Defense Forces (a process that will be completed within weeks of independence, absorbing the Haganah, the Irgun, and Lehi into a single command structure, at least nominally), can field a mobilised strength of approximately 30,000 to 40,000 personnel as of mid-May, organised into brigades, with this number expected to grow rapidly through general mobilisation of the Jewish population, which numbers roughly 650,000 in Palestine at this time. These forces are, however, critically deficient in heavy weapons: artillery, armour, and combat aircraft are almost entirely absent from the Jewish order of battle as of 14th May, the product of British arms embargoes that have applied throughout the Mandate period and have been only partially circumvented through clandestine arms procurement abroad, most significantly an arrangement with Czechoslovakia (itself recently come under communist control) for the supply of rifles, machine guns, and small arms, with shipments beginning to arrive in the weeks immediately before and after independence. A small number of aircraft acquired through various clandestine channels in Europe and the Americas are also beginning to arrive, though an operational Jewish air force does not yet meaningfully exist on this date.

The Arab states, by contrast, field regular national armies equipped, in most cases, with standard British or French equipment of the period artillery, armoured cars, some tanks, and, in the cases of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, functioning air forces. On paper, the combined strength of the invading Arab armies is often cited as being in the range of 20,000 to 25,000 men committed in the initial stages, considerably smaller than is sometimes assumed, and notably smaller than the mobilised Jewish forces though the qualitative gap in heavy equipment, particularly artillery and air power, is real and significant, and would prove decisive in certain battles, particularly in the opening weeks.

The Arab Legion of Transjordan, trained and partly officered by British personnel (a fact that will generate considerable controversy, given Britain's formal position of neutrality and its continued treaty relationship with Transjordan), is generally regarded as the best-trained and most professional Arab force in the field, though it is also among the smallest, with a strength of roughly 4,500 to 6,000 men at the outset a force King Abdullah has been notably reluctant to commit beyond what he regards as the territory of the prospective Arab state, reflecting his own calculations about what he hopes to achieve and what he hopes to avoid.

V. Key Actors and Their Calculations

The Jewish Agency / Provisional Government of Israel

Led by David Ben-Gurion, who will become the first Prime Minister, and with Chaim Weizmann the elder statesman of the Zionist movement and a figure of considerable international standing, particularly in Washington positioned to become the first President, the Jewish Agency leadership faces the immediate and existential question of survival. Every available resource is being directed toward acquiring arms, securing diplomatic recognition (above all from the United States and, if possible, the Soviet Union, in the hope that competing superpower recognitions will deter outright hostility from either), and consolidating territorial control ahead of the expected invasion. Internally, the leadership must also manage the integration of the more radical Irgun and Lehi organisations into a unified state structure, a process that is far from complete and carries the potential for serious internal friction, as demonstrated by tensions over arms shipments and the chain of command in the weeks following independence.

Transjordan and King Abdullah

King Abdullah I occupies a unique position among the Arab leaders: his Arab Legion is poised to enter Palestine not merely to oppose the Jewish state, but to secure for Transjordan the territory of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem with its Old City and holy sites an ambition that long predates the events of 1948 and reflects Abdullah's broader vision of a 'Greater Syria' under Hashemite leadership. Abdullah's relationship with Britain remains close Transjordan is bound to Britain by treaty, and British officers and subsidies underpin the Arab Legion creating an uncomfortable position for London, which is publicly committed to ending its role in Palestine while remaining deeply enmeshed, through Transjordan, in the conflict about to begin there.

Egypt

Egypt's decision to commit forces to the Palestine war is driven by a combination of pan-Arab solidarity, domestic political pressures (with the Egyptian monarchy and government facing criticism from nationalist and Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, for inaction), and critically a determination not to allow Transjordan to expand its territory and influence unchecked. Egypt's military intervention is, in this sense, as much about the balance of power within the Arab world as it is about Palestine itself.

Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq

Syria, the most ideologically committed of the Arab states to the cause of Palestinian Arab nationalism (and historically resistant to Hashemite ambitions in the Levant), commits forces along the northern front. Lebanon's contribution is modest, reflecting its small military and its delicate internal sectarian balance. Iraq, geographically more distant, commits an expeditionary force that will operate primarily in coordination with, but also in friction with, the forces of Transjordan, given the close dynastic ties but also rivalries between the Hashemite courts of Baghdad and Amman.

The United Kingdom

Britain occupies an acutely awkward position. Having announced its withdrawal and its unwillingness to continue administering the Mandate, Britain nonetheless retains its treaty

relationship with Transjordan and a residual military presence in the region, including in Egypt and Iraq under separate arrangements. British officials are acutely aware that the Arab Legion's British-trained officers and the broader perception of British sympathy for the Arab side will draw scrutiny and criticism, particularly from Washington and from Jewish and pro-Zionist opinion in the United States, even as Britain insists on its neutrality in the conflict about to begin.

The United States

Washington's Palestine policy in the spring of 1948 has been marked by visible inconsistency: supportive of partition at the UN in November 1947, then flirting with a trusteeship alternative in March 1948 amid State Department concerns about the strategic costs of alienating the Arab world (and its oil), before swinging back toward recognition of the Jewish state as independence approaches. This inconsistency reflects a genuine division within the US Government between the White House, sympathetic to Jewish statehood for both moral and domestic political reasons in an election year, and the State Department, which remains deeply concerned about the impact of the Palestine question on US relations with the Arab world and on access to Middle Eastern oil, a concern of growing importance as Europe's postwar recovery and the Marshall Plan increasingly depend on oil supplies.

The Soviet Union

Moscow's support for partition at the United Nations in November 1947 reflected Stalin's calculation that the end of the British Mandate represented an opportunity to weaken British imperial influence in a strategically important region, and that a new state led, at this stage, by a Jewish Agency leadership with substantial roots in the socialist and labour movements of the Yishuv might prove more amenable to Soviet influence than a continuation of British-dominated arrangements. Whether this calculation will translate into prompt Soviet recognition of the new state, and what form Soviet support might take, remains to be seen as of 14th May.

VI. Open Questions Facing the Committee

As the committee convenes, the situation in Palestine presents a series of acute and interlocking questions that delegates representing the relevant powers will need to address, whether explicitly or through the directives they choose to submit:

- Will the major powers extend recognition to the Jewish state immediately upon its declaration, and if so, on what terms – de facto or de jure? What are the strategic costs and benefits of recognition, both for the recognising power's standing in the Arab world and for its relationship with the new state?
- What arms embargoes, if any, will the major powers maintain or impose with respect to the combatants, and how effectively can such embargoes be enforced given existing arms relationships (Britain's treaty obligations to Arab states, clandestine arms channels to the Jewish forces)?
- How will the Arab states coordinate – or fail to coordinate – their military efforts, given the divergent and at times competing territorial ambitions of Transjordan, Egypt, and others?

- What role, if any, will the United Nations play once fighting begins will calls for a ceasefire be pursued, and if so, on whose terms, and with what prospect of compliance from parties who have just gone to war?
- How will the unfolding refugee crisis already substantial before the regular Arab armies have even crossed the border be addressed, and by whom? What responsibilities, if any, do the major powers bear?
- What are the implications of this conflict for Britain's broader strategic position in the Middle East, including its bases in Egypt, its position in Iraq, and its relationships with the Gulf states?

Crisis Two: Germany and Berlin — The Collapse of Four-Power Government

I. The Inheritance of Potsdam

The crisis brewing in occupied Germany in May 1948 has its roots in the ambiguities and contradictions of the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, under which the victorious wartime allies the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and (subsequently) France divided Germany into four occupation zones, with Berlin itself, though located deep within the Soviet zone, similarly divided into four sectors and placed under joint four-power administration through the Allied Kontrollrat, or Allied Control Council.

Potsdam articulated a set of common goals for occupied Germany, often summarised as the 'Four Ds': demilitarisation, denazification, democratisation, and decentralisation. It also provided for Germany to be treated, in the words of the agreement, 'as a single economic unit', with common policies on matters such as industrial production, currency, and reparations. From the outset, however, the four occupying powers brought fundamentally different priorities to the table. The Soviet Union, having suffered catastrophic losses and devastation during the war and determined never again to face a resurgent German military threat prioritised the extraction of industrial capacity and equipment as reparations, and the establishment of a buffer of friendly, pliable states along its western border. The Western powers, increasingly concerned by 1946 and 1947 with the economic stagnation of occupied Germany (and its drag on the broader recovery of Western Europe, which depended on German coal, steel, and manufactured goods), came to prioritise German economic reconstruction over continued reparations extraction.

These divergent priorities produced friction almost immediately. By May 1946, the United States had effectively halted the transfer of reparations from its zone to the Soviet Union, citing the failure of the Soviet zone to contribute agricultural surpluses to feed the Western zones as envisioned under the principle of treating Germany as an economic unit. The Soviet Union, for its part, proceeded to extract reparations and resources from its own zone largely unilaterally, including through the dismantling of industrial plants and their transport to the Soviet Union, and through the establishment of Soviet-controlled joint-stock companies (the so-called SAGs) that effectively removed substantial portions of the East German economy from German control altogether.

II. The Hardening of the Eastern Bloc and the Western Response

The broader geopolitical context for the German question hardened dramatically through 1946 and 1947. Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in March 1946 gave early public voice to Western anxieties about Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe. Through 1946 and 1947, communist parties across Eastern and Central Europe — in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania — employed what came to be known as 'salami tactics': a gradual, methodical process of marginalising and eliminating non-communist coalition partners in nominally pluralist postwar governments, typically with the backing, explicit or implicit, of the Soviet military and security apparatus. By early 1948, this process was essentially complete across the region, with the final and most dramatic instance occurring in February 1948, when a coup in Czechoslovakia — previously regarded in the West as the most genuinely democratic and pluralist of the Eastern European states — brought the country fully under Communist Party control, and prompted the suicide (or, as widely suspected at the time and since, the murder) of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk.

The Czechoslovak coup sent shockwaves through Western capitals, lending new urgency to a process already underway: the consolidation of the Western occupation zones in Germany into a coherent economic and, increasingly, political unit, separate from and explicitly counterposed to the Soviet zone. The American and British zones had already been merged for economic administration purposes in 1947, forming what was known as the 'Bizonia'; the integration of the French zone into this arrangement — producing the 'Trizone' — was proceeding through the spring of 1948, though France, more wary than the Anglo-American powers of any arrangement that might prematurely restore German economic and political strength, has been a less than enthusiastic partner in this process, requiring continued negotiation and reassurance from Washington and London.

On the economic front, the announcement of the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program) by US Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947, and its subsequent enactment by the US Congress in the spring of 1948, represents perhaps the single most consequential economic initiative of the postwar period. The Marshall Plan offers American financial assistance to European states for postwar reconstruction, explicitly including the Western zones of occupied Germany, on the basis of European-coordinated plans for the use of such assistance. The Soviet Union, after initially sending a delegation to preliminary discussions in Paris in mid-1947, withdrew and denounced the plan as an instrument of American economic imperialism designed to subordinate European economies to Washington — and, crucially, forbade the states of its emerging bloc in Eastern Europe from participating, even in cases (such as Czechoslovakia and Poland) where there had been genuine interest in doing so. In response, the Soviet Union has begun constructing its own framework of bilateral trade agreements among Eastern European states, sometimes referred to as the Molotov Plan, formalising the economic division of the continent that the Marshall Plan's geographic scope had already implied.

III. The London Conference and the Collapse of the Control Council

The most immediate institutional crisis affecting Germany as of mid-May 1948 concerns the breakdown of the Allied Control Council — the body theoretically responsible for joint four-power governance of occupied Germany — and the parallel process, underway in London, by which the three Western powers (joined by the Benelux states) are charting a path toward a separate West German political entity, explicitly without Soviet participation.

The London Conference on Germany convened in two sessions: an initial session from late February to early March 1948, and a second session that began in late April and remains ongoing as of the freeze date, expected to conclude in the coming weeks with a set of formal recommendations what will become known as the London Recommendations to be transmitted to the minister-presidents of the German states (Länder) in the Western zones, instructing them on the steps necessary to establish a West German constitutional government, including the convening of a constituent assembly.

The convening of this conference, and above all the deliberate exclusion of the Soviet Union from it, has been a source of acute friction within the Allied Control Council, the nominal four-power body still notionally responsible for governing Germany as a whole. On 20th March 1948, the Soviet representative on the Control Council, Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, used a Council meeting to demand that the Western representatives disclose the substance and outcome of the London talks, on the grounds that decisions concerning Germany's future fell within the Control Council's jurisdiction and could not legitimately be taken by a subset of the occupying powers acting alone. The Western representatives Generals Clay (US), Robertson (UK), and Koenig (France) responded that the London Conference had, at that stage, produced only recommendations to their respective governments, not decisions or directives, and that they had received no formal instructions arising from it. Sokolovsky, reading from a prepared statement, denounced this response as confirmation that the Western powers regarded the Control Council merely as a 'screen' for unilateral actions in their own zones, and the Soviet delegation subsequently withdrew from the meeting.

This walkout effectively ended the functioning of the Allied Control Council as a governing body for Germany as a whole. While the body has not been formally dissolved, and while routine administrative contacts between the occupying powers in Berlin continue at lower levels, the central mechanism through which the four powers were meant to coordinate policy for Germany has, for all practical purposes, ceased to operate as of mid-May 1948. Each set of occupying powers the Western trio on one side, the Soviet Union on the other is now governing its own zone with increasing autonomy, even as both sides continue to maintain the formal fiction of eventual German reunification under some four-power framework.

IV. The Currency Question — A Crisis Already Visible on the Horizon

Perhaps the single most consequential unresolved issue as of 14th May 1948 though it has not yet come to a head is the question of currency reform in occupied Germany. The Reichsmark, the currency inherited from the Nazi period, has been rendered essentially worthless by years of wartime deficit financing, postwar money-printing, and the simple fact that there is little for German consumers to buy with it. A primitive barter economy, with cigarettes functioning as an informal parallel currency in many areas, has emerged across all four occupation zones, and is widely understood by economists and occupation officials on all sides to be a fundamental obstacle to any meaningful economic recovery.

The Western powers have, for some time, been developing plans for a comprehensive currency reform in their zones the introduction of an entirely new currency, to be backed by a new central banking structure, designed to restore confidence, eliminate the black market's grip on the economy, and create the monetary stability that the Marshall Plan's reconstruction efforts will require to be effective. These plans, by mid-May 1948, are at an

advanced stage of preparation, though they have not yet been implemented, and their precise timing remains a closely guarded matter among Western occupation authorities.

The Soviet Union is aware, in general terms, that currency reform is being prepared in the West, and has been developing its own currency reform plans for its zone in parallel, a recognition that whatever the West does, the existing Reichsmark cannot survive in its current form indefinitely. The truly explosive question, which remains entirely unresolved as of the freeze date, concerns Berlin: will a Western currency reform, if and when implemented, be extended to the Western sectors of Berlin—a city that lies, geographically, entirely within the Soviet zone, more than a hundred miles from the nearest Western-zone territory? Such an extension would, from the Soviet perspective, represent a direct intrusion of a separate Western economic system into the heart of territory the Soviet Union regards as falling within its sphere of administrative responsibility. Soviet officials have given no indication of how they might respond to such a step, but the structural logic of the situation—an economically separate Western enclave, dependent for its physical access on routes running through Soviet-controlled territory, deep inside that territory—is apparent to occupation officials on all sides, even if none has yet articulated publicly what might follow.

V. Access to Berlin — The Vulnerability Beneath the Surface

Berlin's position—surrounded entirely by the Soviet zone of occupation, roughly 110 miles from the nearest point of Western-zone territory—has always represented a fundamental vulnerability for the Western position in the city, one that has, until now, been managed through a set of informal wartime-era arrangements rather than any binding written agreement. Access between Berlin and the Western zones depends on a small number of designated road, rail, and canal routes crossing Soviet-zone territory, along with three twenty-mile-wide air corridors, the latter established through an agreement of the Allied Control Council in November 1945.

Crucially, no comprehensive written agreement guarantees Western access to Berlin by land. The arrangements in place rest substantially on the practical cooperation of occupation authorities and on verbal understandings reached in 1945, a fact that Western legal advisors are well aware leaves the Western position in Berlin more exposed than is generally appreciated by the wider public. In the weeks leading up to mid-May 1948, Soviet authorities have already begun to demonstrate an increased willingness to use administrative friction over access—introducing additional documentation requirements, conducting more rigorous inspections of Western military trains and road traffic moving through the Soviet zone, and on occasion delaying or briefly halting such traffic on technical grounds. None of this yet constitutes anything approaching a blockade, and Western occupation authorities have, for the most part, treated these incidents as a nuisance rather than as evidence of a developing strategy—but the pattern is noted, and is the subject of internal reporting among Western military governments, even as of mid-May.

The air corridors, by contrast, rest on a somewhat firmer (though still not unchallengeable) legal foundation, having been the subject of an actual agreement among the occupying powers, a fact whose significance is not lost on Western planners, even though, as of mid-May 1948, no one has yet seriously contemplated that an airlift might become the primary means of sustaining the population of a major city.

VI. Key Actors and Their Positions

The United States

General Lucius D. Clay, the US Military Governor in Germany, has emerged as one of the most forceful advocates within the US Government for a firm Western posture in Germany, including with respect to Berlin. Clay has consistently argued that any Western retreat from Berlin – whether under direct pressure or through a negotiated withdrawal – would deal a catastrophic blow to American credibility in Europe at precisely the moment the Marshall Plan is beginning to take effect, and would be read across the continent as evidence that American commitments could not be relied upon. Washington's broader German policy, increasingly, is oriented toward the consolidation of a viable West German state integrated into the Western economic and eventually security architecture – though the question of German rearmament remains, at this stage, far too sensitive to contemplate openly, given the recency of the war and the concerns of France in particular.

The United Kingdom

Britain, as the occupying power for the zone in which the bulk of Germany's industrial capacity (the Ruhr) is located, has perhaps the most direct economic stake in German recovery of any of the Western powers, while also bearing significant occupation costs at a time of severe British financial strain. British policy broadly aligns with the American position on the need for Western German economic consolidation, though London has, at various points, shown somewhat greater willingness than Washington to explore arrangements that might offer the Soviet Union some form of continued involvement in German affairs, reflecting both genuine concern about the consequences of permanent division and an awareness of Britain's own limited capacity to sustain indefinite confrontation.

France

France's German policy in 1948 is shaped above all by historical memory and security anxiety: having been invaded by Germany three times in seventy years, French policymakers remain deeply wary of any arrangement that might restore German economic or, especially, military strength too quickly or too completely. France has been the most reluctant of the three Western occupying powers to integrate its zone into the emerging Trizone arrangement, has sought international (rather than purely German) control over the Ruhr's coal and steel resources, and continues to harbour ambitions – increasingly difficult to sustain in practice – regarding the permanent detachment of the Saar region from Germany. French domestic politics, in which the Communist Party (PCF) remains a significant force despite having been excluded from government in 1947, add a further layer of complexity to Paris's calculations, as discussed further in the section of this guide addressing Western Europe's internal political battles.

The Soviet Union

Soviet policy in Germany, as of mid-1948, can be read in two ways that are not mutually exclusive: as a genuine attempt to prevent the consolidation of a separate, Western-aligned German state – which Moscow regards, with some justification, as a fundamental violation of the principle, enshrined at Potsdam, that Germany be treated as a single economic and political entity – and as an effort to maximise Soviet leverage over the terms on which any

eventual settlement of the German question is reached. The Soviet walkout from the Control Council in March can be understood as both a protest against a fait accompli and a signal that the Soviet Union retains means of making the continuation of the Western position in Berlin, an enclave deep within Soviet-controlled territory, considerably more difficult, should Moscow choose to employ them.

VII. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- Should the Western powers proceed with currency reform in their zones, and if so, should this reform be extended to the Western sectors of Berlin with all the risks that step might entail or should Berlin be treated as a special case?
- Is there any prospect of restoring some functioning version of four-power governance in Germany, or has that possibility already passed with the Control Council walkout? If restoration is impossible, what framework should govern relations between the Western zones and the Soviet zone going forward?
- How should the Western powers respond to incremental Soviet interference with access to Berlin through firm protest, reciprocal measures, contingency planning, or some combination? At what point, if any, does administrative friction become something that requires a more forceful response?
- What are the implications of the London Conference process for France's broader security concerns, and how might these be addressed without derailing the consolidation of the Western zones?
- How does the trajectory of events in Germany interact with the broader question of Marshall Plan implementation, and with the political battles being fought in France and Italy over communist influence?

Crisis Three: The Chinese Civil War — The Balance Tips

I. From Wartime Alliance to Renewed Civil War

The civil war between the Nationalist government of the Republic of China, led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) party, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong, did not begin in 1945—it is, in essence, the resumption of a conflict that dates back to the late 1920s, suspended (imperfectly, and with periodic outbreaks of fighting even during the period of nominal cooperation) during the years of Japanese occupation, when both the Nationalists and the Communists fought, separately and with considerable mutual suspicion, against a common Japanese enemy.

With Japan's surrender in September 1945, the underlying conflict between the KMT and the CCP resumed almost immediately, accelerated by the scramble of both sides to take control of territory above all Manchuria, China's most industrialised region, recently occupied by Soviet forces vacated by the defeated Japanese. The United States, through General George Marshall's mediation mission in 1945 and 1946, attempted to broker a coalition government and a unified national army incorporating both KMT and CCP forces. These efforts produced a series of agreements—most notably an agreement in February 1946 on the principles of military reorganisation—that were never implemented in practice, as renewed fighting in Manchuria, beginning in the spring of 1946, overtook the diplomatic

process. By the autumn of 1946, Marshall's mediation effort had effectively collapsed, and full-scale civil war had resumed across much of China.

II. The Military Balance Through 1947

At the close of 1947, the Nationalist government's position appeared, on paper, formidable. Official figures put Nationalist military strength at approximately five million men, against an estimated Communist strength of little more than a million. The Nationalist government controlled the great majority of China's territory and population, including all of its major cities, and continued to receive military and economic assistance from the United States, however much that assistance fell short of what Chiang Kai-shek's government repeatedly requested.

Yet beneath these aggregate figures, the qualitative picture was considerably less favourable to the Nationalists, and had been deteriorating steadily. Years of war against Japan, followed immediately by renewed civil war, had left the Nationalist economy in a state of catastrophic inflation, eroding the purchasing power of soldiers' pay and civilian savings alike, and corroding both military morale and civilian confidence in the government. Corruption within the Nationalist military and civil administration the diversion of supplies intended for frontline troops, the padding of unit rosters with non-existent soldiers whose pay was pocketed by officers, and the generally poor treatment of ordinary soldiers had become endemic, a fact Chiang Kai-shek himself repeatedly acknowledged and condemned in internal communications and speeches through 1947 and 1948, even as he proved largely unable to remedy it. The Nationalist strategy through 1947 had increasingly become defensive: attempting to hold a network of isolated cities and garrisons across Manchuria and North China, resupplied where necessary by air, while ceding effective control of the surrounding countryside to Communist forces and their local administrations.

The Communist forces, by contrast, while smaller in aggregate numbers, possessed a number of decisive advantages that had become increasingly apparent through 1947: superior morale, rooted in a combination of ideological commitment and, in many rural areas, genuinely popular land reform policies that had won the CCP substantial peasant support; a more cohesive command structure under experienced commanders such as Lin Biao, who directed Communist operations in Manchuria; and access to substantial stocks of weapons and equipment captured from the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria at the end of the Second World War, stocks that Soviet occupation forces in the region had, in practice, allowed to fall into Communist hands during the withdrawal of Soviet troops in early 1946, even as Moscow maintained formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government and avoided any public acknowledgment of support for the CCP.

III. The Situation as of May 1948

By the spring of 1948, the trajectory of the war had become unmistakable, even if its ultimate endpoint complete Communist victory across the mainland was not yet a foregone conclusion in the minds of most contemporary observers, including within the US Government. Communist forces under Lin Biao had, through the winter of 1947 to 1948, systematically isolated and, in a number of cases, captured Nationalist-held cities across Manchuria, employing a strategy of siege and attrition against garrisons that the Nationalist

high command found itself unable to relieve, given the breakdown of overland supply routes and the limitations of air resupply for cities under prolonged siege.

In North China, Communist forces achieved a series of further successes in the spring of 1948, including the capture of Luoyang in early April a city of considerable historical and symbolic significance and the recapture, later in April, of Yan'an, the wartime Communist capital that Nationalist forces had occupied (at considerable cost and to substantial propaganda fanfare) in 1947. The recapture of Yan'an, in particular, carried significant symbolic weight, representing a reversal of one of the few clear Nationalist successes of the preceding two years.

As of mid-May 1948, the overall picture is one of a Nationalist government still controlling the great majority of China's population and territory, including all major cities in the populous heartland regions, but facing a steadily deteriorating military position in the north and northeast, a financial and economic crisis driven by runaway inflation that shows no sign of abating, and growing indications visible to American observers, though not yet fully reflected in American policy that the military balance in Manchuria and North China has shifted decisively, even if the full consequences of this shift will not become unambiguously clear until the latter half of 1948, when a succession of major Nationalist garrisons and cities will fall in rapid succession.

On the diplomatic and economic front, the Truman Administration finds itself in a politically delicate position. Continued US assistance to the Nationalist government remains official policy, and substantial sums of aid hundreds of millions of dollars over the preceding years have been provided, with further assistance under active consideration in Washington as of mid-1948. Yet a considerable body of opinion within the State Department, and increasingly among informed observers more broadly, has concluded that the fundamental problems afflicting the Nationalist war effort corruption, inflation, declining morale, and the erosion of popular support are not problems that additional American material assistance can solve, and that further aid risks being, in the memorable phrase that will become associated with this debate, akin to 'pouring sand down a rathole'. At the same time, no senior American official is willing to be associated with a policy that might be portrayed, domestically, as having facilitated the 'loss' of China to communism a political vulnerability that looms over the China debate throughout 1948 and into the following years, particularly with a presidential election approaching in the United States.

IV. Key Actors

Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government

Chiang Kai-shek remains the dominant figure in the Nationalist government, though his authority is increasingly challenged by the deteriorating military and economic situation, by factional rivalries within the KMT, and by growing calls from some quarters within China and, with increasing frequency, from American observers for political and military reforms that Chiang has shown limited willingness or capacity to implement. The Nationalist government's continued international recognition, including its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (a status it has held since the organisation's founding), remains an important asset, but one whose practical value is diminishing as the government's domestic position weakens.

Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party

The CCP leadership under Mao Zedong, operating from base areas in North China and increasingly confident in its military position following the successes of the winter of 1947 to 1948, continues to combine military operations with an extensive programme of land reform in areas under its control a programme that, whatever its other consequences, has proven highly effective in generating peasant support and providing a steady stream of recruits and supplies for Communist forces. The CCP's relationship with the Soviet Union remains, as of mid-1948, somewhat ambiguous from the outside: Moscow maintains formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government and has avoided overt acknowledgment of support for the CCP, even as the practical benefits the Communists derived from the Soviet occupation of Manchuria in 1945 and 1946 are widely understood among informed observers.

The United States

Washington's China policy in mid-1948 is characterised by a search for options that do not exist: a policy that would prevent a Communist victory without requiring either a dramatic escalation of American material commitment (for which there is little domestic appetite, particularly given competing priorities in Europe under the Marshall Plan) or American combat involvement (which is not seriously contemplated by anyone in the US Government). The result, as of mid-1948, is a policy of continued but constrained assistance, accompanied by growing private acknowledgment among American officials that this policy is unlikely to alter the war's underlying trajectory.

The Soviet Union

Soviet policy toward China in mid-1948 remains characterised by caution and ambiguity. While the practical benefits extended to Communist forces in Manchuria in 1945 and 1946 are an important part of the story of the CCP's military recovery, Moscow has, since then, maintained a posture of formal correctness toward the Nationalist government and has avoided steps that might be read as overt support for the CCP a caution that reflects both Stalin's general wariness of movements he does not fully control and a calculation that the costs of overt involvement in China, at a time when Soviet attention and resources are heavily focused on Europe, would outweigh the benefits.

V. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- Should the United States increase, maintain, or reconsider its assistance to the Nationalist government, given the apparent trajectory of the conflict? What conditions, if any, should be attached to continued assistance?
- What signals, if any, should the Soviet Union send regarding its relationship with the Chinese Communist Party, and how might these signals affect the broader Sino-Soviet relationship going forward?
- How does the apparent trajectory of the Chinese Civil War affect the calculations of the major powers regarding their commitments and posture elsewhere in Europe, in Korea, and in Southeast Asia?

- What position should the international community take regarding the continued representation of China at the United Nations and in other international bodies, should the military situation continue to deteriorate for the Nationalist government?

Crisis Four: The Greek Civil War — The Truman Doctrine's Proving Ground

I. The Origins of the Conflict

The Greek Civil War, raging since 1946 (with roots stretching back to the resistance and collaboration politics of the wartime occupation period and the brief but bitter conflict of December 1944, sometimes called the Dekemvriana, between communist-led resistance forces and British troops in Athens), pits the Greek government—a monarchy restored in 1946 following a contested plebiscite, and supported successively by Britain and, increasingly, the United States—against the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE), the military wing of the Greek Communist Party (KKE).

The KKE and its associated resistance organisation, EAM-ELAS, had been the dominant force in the Greek resistance to Axis occupation during the Second World War, controlling substantial areas of the Greek countryside by the time of liberation in 1944. The Dekemvriana of December 1944, in which British forces intervened to prevent what they regarded as an attempted communist takeover of Athens, represented an early and bloody preview of the conflict to come, though a fragile peace (the Varkiza Agreement of February 1945) temporarily papered over the underlying divisions. That peace did not hold: by 1946, with the KKE rejecting the legitimacy of the restored monarchy and the government conducting what communist and left-wing Greeks regarded as a campaign of repression against former resistance fighters, the Democratic Army of Greece had been formed and full-scale civil war had resumed.

II. The Truman Doctrine and American Involvement

The pivotal moment in the international dimension of the Greek Civil War came in early 1947, when the British Government—facing its own severe postwar financial constraints, and having borne the principal burden of supporting the Greek government's war effort since 1944—informed Washington that it would no longer be able to continue providing military and economic assistance to Greece (and to Turkey, facing its own pressures from the Soviet Union over the Turkish Straits) beyond the end of March 1947.

President Truman's response, delivered in an address to a joint session of Congress on 12th March 1947, became known as the Truman Doctrine: a declaration that it would be the policy of the United States to 'support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures', and a request to Congress for \$400 million in assistance to Greece and Turkey. The speech, and the doctrine it articulated, is widely regarded by historians as a foundational moment in the emergence of the policy of containment—the first explicit American commitment to resist the expansion of communist influence through assistance to threatened governments, articulated in terms that, while framed around the specific situations in Greece and Turkey, carried unmistakably global implications.

In the year that followed, substantial American military and economic assistance has flowed to the Greek government, including military advisors, equipment, and funding for the

reconstruction and re-equipping of the Greek National Army. This assistance has not yet produced a decisive shift in the military balance as of mid-1948, but it has prevented the kind of governmental collapse that some observers feared might occur in 1946 and early 1947, and has begun the process of professionalising and re-equipping Greek government forces in ways that will, in the latter half of 1948 and into 1949, contribute to a gradual shift in the military balance.

III. The Situation as of May 1948

As of mid-May 1948, the civil war remains active and brutal across much of Greece, with the Democratic Army of Greece conducting operations primarily in the mountainous regions of northern Greece in Epirus, Macedonia, and Thrace close to the borders with Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, all three of which have, since the formation of the DSE, provided sanctuary, training facilities, and material support to the communist insurgency, allowing DSE forces to retreat across these borders when faced with government offensives, and to receive resupply from across them.

This cross-border support has been a persistent source of friction at the United Nations, where the Greek government has repeatedly brought complaints regarding interference by its communist neighbours before the Security Council, leading to the establishment of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) to investigate and document such activity. UNSCOB's findings have generally supported the Greek government's allegations, but action at the Security Council has been repeatedly blocked by the veto of the Soviet Union, which has consistently characterised the conflict as an internal Greek matter in which outside interference specifically, British and American support for the Athens government is the true source of the problem.

A development of considerable, though not yet fully appreciated, significance for the trajectory of the conflict has occurred in the weeks immediately preceding the freeze date: the dramatic rupture between Yugoslavia, under Josip Broz Tito, and the Soviet Union and the broader Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau, the coordinating body for European communist parties established in 1947). While the most visible and formal manifestations of this rupture Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform will occur slightly after the freeze date (in late June 1948), the underlying tensions between Belgrade and Moscow have been building for some months and are, to varying degrees, known to or suspected by Western intelligence services as of mid-May. Yugoslavia has been, alongside Albania, one of the principal sources of cross-border support for the Democratic Army of Greece; a serious rupture between Tito and Stalin carries profound, if not yet fully realised, implications for the DSE's external support network, implications that neither the Greek government, the DSE, nor the Western powers have yet had occasion to fully digest as of the freeze date.

Within Greece itself, the human cost of the conflict continues to mount. Both government and DSE forces have been accused of atrocities against civilian populations in contested areas. The government has, in various periods of the conflict, pursued policies of forced relocation of populations from contested rural areas partly for security reasons, partly to deny the DSE access to recruits and supplies a practice that foreshadows, in some respects, approaches that will later be employed in other counter-insurgency contexts,

including the Malayan Emergency that will begin in Southeast Asia within weeks of the freeze date.

IV. Key Actors

The Greek Government

The Greek government, headed by a series of coalition cabinets reflecting the country's fractious parliamentary politics but united in opposition to the communist insurgency, and operating under the restored monarchy of King Paul (who acceded to the throne in April 1947 following the death of his brother, King George II), is heavily dependent on American assistance and advice, channelled through the American Mission for Aid to Greece. Domestically, the government faces not only the military challenge of the DSE but also the broader task of economic reconstruction in a country devastated by occupation, famine, and now years of civil conflict on top of the Second World War.

The Democratic Army of Greece and the KKE

The DSE, under the overall political direction of the KKE leadership (with General Secretary Nikos Zachariadis the dominant figure), continues to control substantial areas of rural and mountainous Greece, particularly in the north, and has, at various points, proclaimed the establishment of a 'Provisional Democratic Government' as a rival to the Athens government though this government exercises effective administration only in the limited areas under DSE control. The DSE's strategy has increasingly shifted toward attempting to hold fixed territory in northern Greece, a shift that, while reflecting growing confidence, will prove militarily costly once government forces, increasingly well-equipped through American assistance, are able to bring concentrated force to bear against fixed positions rather than facing a purely guerrilla adversary.

Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria

All three of Greece's communist-governed northern neighbours have provided support to the DSE, though the extent and reliability of this support varies and as events in the weeks following the freeze date will demonstrate with respect to Yugoslavia is subject to the broader currents of intra-communist politics, including the deteriorating relationship between Tito and Stalin, the implications of which for the Greek conflict remain, as of mid-May, only beginning to be understood.

The United States and United Kingdom

The United States, having assumed the principal role in supporting the Greek government following Britain's 1947 withdrawal from that role, regards the outcome of the Greek Civil War as a critical test of the containment policy articulated in the Truman Doctrine a test whose outcome, whatever direction it takes, will be read globally as a signal of American capacity and will to support governments facing communist insurgency. Britain retains a residual interest and presence in Greece, including continued military advisory roles, but has, by 1948, ceded the primary role to Washington.

V. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- How might developments in the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union — not yet publicly manifest as of the freeze date, but increasingly apparent to informed observers — affect the trajectory of the Greek Civil War and the calculations of all parties involved?
- Should the United States increase its military assistance to the Greek government, and what would be the implications of doing so for the broader application of the Truman Doctrine elsewhere?
- What, if anything, can be done at the United Nations regarding the question of cross-border support for the DSE, given the persistent deadlock at the Security Council?
- How does the Greek conflict intersect with the broader question of Balkan stability, including the unresolved status of disputes such as that over Trieste and the broader pattern of Soviet versus Western influence in southeastern Europe?

Crisis Five: Kashmir — The First India-Pakistan War

I. Partition and Its Unfinished Business

The independence of India and Pakistan in August 1947, achieved through the partition of British India along broadly religious lines, was accompanied by violence on a scale that shocked even observers accustomed to the brutalities of the preceding decade: an estimated several hundred thousand to over a million deaths in communal violence, and the displacement of an estimated ten to twelve million people across the new India-Pakistan border in the months immediately following partition, in what remains one of the largest forced migrations in human history.

Amid this cataclysm, the future of the some 565 princely states, nominally sovereign territories that had maintained a form of indirect relationship with the British Crown rather than direct British rule, remained to be settled. The overwhelming majority of these states acceded, with varying degrees of willingness, to either India or Pakistan based on geography and, in most cases, the religious composition of their populations. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir presented an acute exception to this pattern: a Muslim-majority population ruled by a Hindu maharaja, Hari Singh, who initially sought to avoid acceding to either dominion, hoping to maintain an independent status, an aspiration that proved entirely unsustainable given Kashmir's strategic location and the stakes both new dominions attached to its disposition.

II. The Outbreak of War

In October 1947, the situation in Kashmir was transformed by the incursion of armed tribesmen from Pakistan's North-West Frontier regions, organised and at least loosely supported by elements of the Pakistani state, into Kashmir from the west. These tribal forces advanced rapidly toward the Kashmiri capital, Srinagar, prompting Maharaja Hari Singh, facing the imminent collapse of his rule, to appeal to India for military assistance. India's government, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, made clear that such assistance would be conditional on Kashmir's accession to India, a condition the Maharaja accepted on 26th October 1947, signing an Instrument of Accession that India regards as having definitively and legally incorporated Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union. Pakistan, for its part,

has never recognised the validity of this accession, regarding it as having been obtained under duress and in violation of an earlier standstill agreement between Kashmir and Pakistan.

Indian troops were airlifted into Srinagar beginning on 27th October 1947, halting the tribal advance just outside the city, and the conflict rapidly escalated into a broader engagement involving Indian regular forces on one side and a combination of tribal irregulars, the locally raised 'Azad' (Free) forces, and increasingly, as the conflict progressed elements of the Pakistani regular army on the other, even though Pakistan maintained, for some time, the formal position that its army was not involved, a position that became progressively less tenable as the conflict wore on.

Through the winter of 1947 to 1948 and into the spring, fighting raged across multiple fronts within Kashmir: in the Kashmir Valley itself, where Indian forces succeeded in pushing back the initial tribal incursion and securing the Valley's main population centres including Srinagar; in the Jammu region to the south, where towns including Mirpur fell to tribal forces (accompanied, in the case of Mirpur, by communal violence against the town's Hindu population, with reports of large-scale abductions); and in the remote and mountainous Gilgit and Ladakh regions to the north and east, where a unit of locally raised troops known as the Gilgit Scouts, under the command of a British officer, Major William Brown, mutinied against the Maharaja's governor in early November 1947 and brought the Gilgit region under the control of forces aligned with Pakistan a development of lasting significance for the eventual territorial division of the disputed state.

III. The Situation as of May 1948

By the spring of 1948, the conflict had settled into a pattern of see-saw fighting along multiple fronts, with neither side able to achieve a decisive overall breakthrough, even as control of specific towns and positions shifted repeatedly. An Indian counter-offensive in the Jammu sector, sometimes referred to as Operation Vijay, conducted between February and early May 1948, succeeded in recapturing the towns of Jhanger and Rajauri, which had earlier fallen to tribal forces, though the broader siege of Indian-held positions at Poonch a town that had been cut off and under siege for months remained only partially relieved.

The most significant development of May 1948 itself is the formal entry of the Pakistan Army into the conflict as an openly acknowledged combatant force a step that, while representing the culmination of a process of escalating Pakistani military involvement that had been underway for months in practice, marks a formal escalation with significant implications. Pakistani forces, having entered the conflict, are reported to be developing plans for operations aimed at the Mehndar Valley area, with the strategic objective of cutting lines of communication supporting Indian forces in the Jammu sector. In the far north, Gilgit Scouts forces aligned with Pakistan have continued to make gains in the high-altitude regions of Ladakh, placing the town of Kargil under siege and besieging Indian-aligned forces at Leh, while also defeating a column attempting to relieve the besieged garrison at Skardu.

In the Kashmir Valley proper, Indian forces, having secured the Valley's core population centres through the winter, are, as of mid-May, embarking on what will become known as the Indian Spring Offensive a sustained push, beginning in early May and continuing through much of the rest of 1948, aimed at consolidating and extending Indian control northward

within the Valley, including operations (subsequently codenamed Erazze) aimed at the towns of Keran and Gurais, and at repelling Pakistani-aligned counterattacks aimed at the town of Tithwal.

On the diplomatic front, the matter has been before the United Nations Security Council since 1st January 1948, when India at the urging of the British Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, who continued to serve in that ceremonial role in India until June 1948 referred the dispute to the Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter, framing it as a complaint regarding Pakistani aid to forces operating against India in Kashmir. Pakistan, in turn, has raised a series of counter-complaints regarding India's broader conduct toward Pakistan, including disputes over the division of assets and resources following partition. The Security Council has, as of mid-May, been engaged in extended deliberations regarding the situation, with the eventual establishment of a UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and a ceasefire resolution still some months away the ceasefire that will eventually take effect will not occur until January 1949, and the plebiscite envisioned by that eventual resolution will, in the event, never take place, leaving the dispute over Kashmir's status unresolved into the indefinite future.

IV. Key Actors

India

India's position, articulated by Prime Minister Nehru and his government, rests on the legal validity of the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947, which India regards as having definitively settled Kashmir's status as part of the Indian Union, subject only to the qualification (offered by India itself, somewhat unusually for a state asserting sovereignty over a territory) that the wishes of the Kashmiri population should ultimately be ascertained, a commitment India has linked to the prior withdrawal of what it characterises as Pakistani aggression from the state.

Pakistan

Pakistan's position, under the leadership of Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah (who will die in September 1948, shortly after the period covered by this guide) and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, rejects the validity of the Instrument of Accession, regards Kashmir's Muslim-majority population as making its accession to Pakistan the natural and appropriate outcome consistent with the broader logic of partition, and characterises Indian military action in Kashmir as itself the aggressive intervention requiring remedy. Pakistan's formal entry into the conflict in May 1948 reflects both the practical reality of escalating military engagement and a calculation regarding the strategic situation on the ground, particularly in the Jammu sector.

The Maharaja's Former State and Local Forces

The forces and political movements within the former princely state itself including the 'Azad Kashmir' forces aligned with Pakistan, the Gilgit Scouts (whose mutiny brought the Gilgit region under Pakistani-aligned control), and political figures within the Kashmir Valley such as Sheikh Abdullah, who heads the administration installed in the Valley under Indian auspices represent a layer of local political dynamics that both India and Pakistan must navigate, and that complicate any straightforward bilateral framing of the dispute.

The United Kingdom

Britain's position is delicate in the extreme: British officers, including Field Marshal Auchinleck (Supreme Commander of the separate Indian and Pakistani armies in the immediate aftermath of partition, a position from which he resigned at the end of 1947) and other officers still serving with both the Indian and Pakistani armies under various transitional arrangements, find themselves in the awkward position of potentially facing each other across a battlefield. Britain, as the former colonial power and as a state maintaining close relationships with both new dominions (both of which remain within the Commonwealth), has sought to avoid being drawn into the dispute while facing pressure from both sides for support.

The United Nations and the Wider World

The Kashmir dispute represents one of the earliest major tests of the United Nations' capacity to manage a conflict between two newly independent states, both of which unusually for disputes of this kind have brought the matter to the Security Council themselves rather than having it imposed upon them, and both of which remain, for now, broadly within the orbit of the Commonwealth rather than aligned with either Cold War bloc, a status that will not remain entirely stable in the years to come but which, as of May 1948, places Kashmir somewhat outside the immediate East-West framework that dominates so much of the rest of this committee's agenda.

V. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- What position should the major powers take at the United Nations regarding the competing Indian and Pakistani positions, and what role, if any, should outside powers play in any eventual resolution mechanism?
- How does the Kashmir conflict affect the broader strategic posture of India and Pakistan as newly independent states, including their relationships with Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, none of which have yet developed settled long-term relationships with either country?
- What are the implications of the conflict for the stability of the broader South Asian region, including for the princely states and border regions not directly party to the dispute?
- Given the scale of the refugee crisis already generated by partition itself, how should the additional displacement caused by the Kashmir conflict be addressed, and by whom?

Crisis Six: Indonesia — The Fragile Renville Truce

I. The Indonesian National Revolution

The Indonesian National Revolution began within days of Japan's surrender in August 1945, when nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia from what had, until the Japanese occupation, been the Dutch East Indies — a vast and resource-rich archipelago that had been under Dutch colonial rule, in one form or another, for over three centuries. The Netherlands, having itself only recently been liberated from Nazi occupation and determined to recover its most valuable colonial possession, did not accept this proclamation, and the years since have been marked by a complex and often

violent struggle between Dutch forces seeking to restore colonial authority (in various proposed forms, including federal arrangements that would preserve a significant Dutch role) and the Indonesian Republic, based primarily on the islands of Java and Sumatra, seeking full and genuine independence.

The conflict has unfolded against a backdrop of considerable international attention, reflecting Indonesia's significance as one of the largest and most populous territories in Southeast Asia, its substantial natural resources (including oil, rubber, and tin), and its position as an early and closely watched test case for the broader question of whether European colonial powers could successfully reassert control over Asian territories following the disruption of the Japanese occupation a question with obvious resonance for observers concerned with the trajectory of decolonisation across Asia more broadly, including in French Indochina, where a broadly analogous struggle between French colonial authorities and the Vietnamese nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh has also been underway since 1946.

II. The Linggadjati Agreement and Its Breakdown

An initial attempt at a negotiated settlement, the Linggadjati Agreement of November 1946, envisioned the eventual creation of a federal 'United States of Indonesia', encompassing the Republic alongside other Indonesian territories, joined with the Netherlands in a broader Dutch-Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown. The agreement was ratified by both sides in 1947, but almost immediately became the subject of fundamentally divergent interpretations: the Republic understood the agreement as recognising its authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra pending the formation of the federal structure, while the Dutch authorities, under Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus van Mook, proceeded to establish a series of separate federal states in territories outside Republican control beginning with the State of East Indonesia in late 1946 and continuing with further such states through 1947 and into 1948 in what the Republic regarded as a deliberate strategy of encircling and marginalising it within the federal structure rather than genuinely sharing power with it.

These divergent interpretations, combined with continued friction over matters such as the disposition of Republican military forces and the administration of disputed areas, led to a major escalation in July and August 1947, when Dutch forces launched a large-scale military offensive referred to by the Dutch as a 'police action' against Republican-held territory on Java and Sumatra, achieving substantial territorial gains, including control of significant portions of Sumatra's plantation regions and parts of West and East Java, before a UN Security Council resolution (proposed by Australia) called for a ceasefire, which both sides nominally accepted in early August 1947, though the ceasefire line generally referred to as the Van Mook Line, after the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General essentially ratified the Dutch military gains of the preceding weeks, leaving the Republic in control of a substantially reduced territory compared to what it had held, or claimed, before the offensive.

III. The Renville Agreement

Following the August 1947 ceasefire, the UN Security Council established a Good Offices Committee comprising representatives nominated by each side (Australia, nominated by the Republic, and Belgium, nominated by the Netherlands) along with a third member, the United States, agreed upon by both to mediate further negotiations between the Republic and the Netherlands. These negotiations, conducted aboard the USS Renville, an American

naval vessel anchored in the harbour at Batavia (Jakarta) made available as neutral ground, produced the Renville Agreement, signed on 17th January 1948.

The Renville Agreement consisted of a set of military provisions essentially formalising the Van Mook Line as a demarcation between Republican and Dutch-controlled territory, with provisions for the withdrawal of Republican forces from pockets of territory behind Dutch lines and a set of political principles, proposed by the Dutch and accepted, with considerable reluctance and only after the Good Offices Committee added six supplementary principles intended to provide some reassurance to the Republic, by the Indonesian side. These political principles envisioned eventual plebiscites in the various territories of the archipelago to determine whether they would join the projected United States of Indonesia as part of the Republic or as separate federal states, with the United States of Indonesia itself to enter into a union with the Netherlands.

From the Republic's perspective, the Renville Agreement represented, in territorial terms, a confirmation of the substantial losses incurred during the 1947 Dutch offensive the agreement is widely regarded, including by many of the Indonesian negotiators themselves, as having been concluded on terms considerably more favourable to the Dutch position, accepted by Sukarno and Hatta primarily out of practical necessity: a recognition that the Republic's military position, following the 1947 offensive, did not permit continued resistance on the existing battle lines, and a hope (which would prove largely unfounded) that international goodwill generated by accepting the agreement might translate into diplomatic support for the Republic's broader objectives going forward.

IV. The Situation as of May 1948

As of mid-May 1948, four months after the signing of the Renville Agreement, the truce it established remains nominally in effect, but its implementation has been, in the assessment of the UN Good Offices Committee (which maintains an active presence in Indonesia monitoring compliance), deeply unsatisfactory to both parties and largely unrealised in its broader political dimensions.

The agreement's most concrete achievement to date has been the evacuation, completed in February 1948, of approximately 35,000 Republican military personnel from pockets of territory that had been left behind Dutch lines following the 1947 offensive and the establishment of the Van Mook Line these forces being withdrawn to Republican-held territory on Java, a process that, while representing compliance with the agreement's military provisions, has also had the effect of concentrating a substantial body of experienced and committed Republican fighters within a steadily shrinking territorial base, with implications for the Republic's capacity for both conventional defence and, should conventional resistance prove impossible, guerrilla warfare implications that will become starkly apparent when the Dutch launch a further major offensive in December 1948, an offensive that lies beyond the freeze date of this committee but whose seeds are visible in the dynamics already underway in mid-1948.

On the political front, the principles agreed at Renville regarding plebiscites and the eventual formation of the United States of Indonesia have made little tangible progress. The Dutch have continued to organise and recognise additional federal states in territories outside Republican control a process the Republic regards as prejudicing the outcome of any future

plebiscite by establishing administrative and political facts on the ground before any vote can occur while normal trade, transport, and communication across the Van Mook Line, which the Renville Agreement had also envisioned being restored, remain largely suspended, with the Good Offices Committee reporting that both sides continue to view the other across the demarcation line 'with reserve and suspicion', in the words of contemporary assessments.

Within the Republic, the political and military leadership faces a difficult balancing act: maintaining sufficient unity and discipline to avoid provoking renewed Dutch military action, while managing internal pressures including from more radical elements who regard the Renville terms as an unacceptable capitulation, and amid a broader regional context in which the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), while not yet at this stage in open conflict with the Republican leadership, represents a current within Republican politics whose trajectory remains to be determined, and which will, later in 1948 (in September, the Madiun Affair), erupt into open conflict with the Republican government a development with significant consequences for how the Republic's struggle for independence will subsequently be perceived in Washington, where concerns about communist influence within nationalist movements across Asia are an increasingly salient factor in policy deliberations.

V. Key Actors

The Republic of Indonesia

Led by President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta, the Republic, based primarily on Java and Sumatra (though with its effective territory considerably reduced by the outcomes of the 1947 offensive and the Renville demarcation), continues to seek full and genuine independence, and views the federal structures being established by the Dutch in other parts of the archipelago with deep suspicion as instruments for perpetuating Dutch influence under a different name.

The Netherlands

Dutch policy, overseen by Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook in Batavia and shaped by the government in The Hague (where domestic political debate over Indonesia policy remains intense, with the colony's economic significance to the Netherlands' own postwar recovery a major factor), continues to pursue the federal model envisioned, in Dutch interpretation, by the Linggadjati and Renville agreements a model that would preserve a substantial Dutch role in a future Indonesian union while formally acknowledging Indonesian self-government.

The United States

The United States, as the third member of the Good Offices Committee and as a power increasingly attentive to the dynamics of nationalist movements across Asia in light of the trajectory of the Chinese Civil War, occupies a position of considerable, if not always decisive, influence. American policy reflects a tension between sympathy for the principle of self-determination and concern heightened by the prospect, however distant it may seem in mid-1948, of communist influence within the Republican movement about the consequences of an Indonesian outcome that might prove unstable or susceptible to radicalisation.

Australia and the Broader Region

Australia, as the Republic's nominee on the Good Offices Committee and as a country whose own region includes the Indonesian archipelago immediately to its north, has taken a position generally more sympathetic to the Republic's perspective than that of the Dutch-nominated Belgium, reflecting both genuine policy views within the Australian Labor government of the period and Australia's own strategic interest in the emergence of a stable post-colonial order in its near region.

VI. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- What steps, if any, can the international community take to ensure fuller implementation of the Renville Agreement's political provisions, including the plebiscites envisioned but not yet conducted?
- How should the major powers respond if the truce established at Renville breaks down and renewed large-scale Dutch military action against the Republic occurs, as appears an increasingly live possibility?
- What are the implications of the Indonesian situation for the broader pattern of decolonisation in Southeast Asia, including the parallel conflict in French Indochina?
- How do concerns about communist influence within Asian nationalist movements a concern of growing salience in Washington given the trajectory of events in China affect the calculations of the major powers regarding their stance on the Indonesian question?

Crisis Seven: Italy and the Battle for Western Europe

I. The Stakes of the Italian Election

On 18th April 1948 less than a month before the freeze date of this committee Italy held the first general election of its post-fascist republican constitution, an election that has come to be regarded, even in its immediate aftermath, as one of the most consequential of the early Cold War period, and which delegates should understand as a recent, live, and still-reverberating event rather than settled history.

The election pitted the Christian Democracy party (DC), led by Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and drawing support from the Catholic Church, the business establishment, and critically substantial covert and overt assistance from the United States, against the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), an electoral alliance dominated by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), at this time the largest communist party in any country outside the Soviet Union, with a membership exceeding two million, in coalition with the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

The stakes attached to this election, both within Italy and internationally, were extraordinarily high. Italy occupies a position of obvious strategic significance: a Mediterranean peninsula with a long coastline, a substantial population and industrial base, and a position that, were it to fall under communist-aligned government, would represent an enormous shift in the balance of the Cold War in Southern Europe, with implications extending to France (where, as discussed below, the Communist Party also represents a major political force), to the broader Mediterranean and North African region, and to the credibility of the Marshall Plan

itself, whose successful implementation depended on the political stability of its principal recipient states.

The lead-up to the election saw an extraordinary mobilisation of resources by all sides. The newly established Central Intelligence Agency conducted one of its first major covert political operations, channelling funds to the Christian Democrats and allied parties through various intermediaries. The Vatican, under Pope Pius XII, mobilised the Church's extensive organisational network – parish priests, Catholic Action groups, and affiliated organisations – in support of the Christian Democrats, framing the election in explicitly religious terms as a choice between Christian civilisation and atheistic communism. The Truman Administration made explicit, in the final weeks of the campaign, that continued American economic assistance under the Marshall Plan could not be guaranteed to an Italy governed by the Popular Democratic Front – a linkage that the PCI's leader, Palmiro Togliatti, would subsequently denounce as amounting to a threat to starve the country into voting against its own interests.

II. The Result and Its Immediate Aftermath

The result, when it came on 18th April, was a decisive victory for the Christian Democrats, who secured 48.5% of the vote – an outright majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, an extraordinary result for a multi-party system – against 31% for the Popular Democratic Front. The result was immediately and widely interpreted, both within Italy and internationally, as a major defeat for communism in its first significant electoral test in Western Europe, and as a vindication of the strategy of combining economic assistance (the Marshall Plan), covert political support, and the mobilisation of anti-communist social and religious institutions that had been deployed in the Italian case.

As of mid-May 1948, the immediate aftermath of the election is still unfolding. The Christian Democrats, under De Gasperi, are in the process of forming a government, which will exclude the PCI and PSI entirely – a stark contrast to the immediate postwar period, when communists had participated in Italian coalition governments (a participation that ended in May 1947, when De Gasperi formed a government excluding the left for the first time). The PCI leadership, while publicly maintaining that the election had not been conducted under genuinely free conditions – citing the combination of American economic pressure, Church mobilisation, and what Togliatti characterised as implicit threats regarding the consequences of a Front victory – has, for the time being, accepted the result and the prospect of an extended period in opposition, rather than pursuing the kind of extra-parliamentary action that some observers had feared might follow a Front defeat (fears that had been substantial enough, in the period immediately before the election, to prompt contingency planning within the US Government regarding possible American or Allied responses to civil disorder or a possible communist seizure of power in the event of electoral defeat being followed by insurrection).

The broader significance of the Italian result for the Marshall Plan and for the consolidation of Western Europe's political alignment in the emerging Cold War can hardly be overstated. Coming roughly two months after the Czechoslovak coup – which had demonstrated, in the starkest possible terms, the fate that could befall a state with a strong communist party operating within a nominally pluralist system – the Italian result was received in Washington, London, and other Western capitals as evidence that the opposite outcome was also

possible: that determined and well-resourced support for anti-communist political forces could produce a decisive result even in a country, like Italy, where the Communist Party commanded very substantial genuine popular support.

III. France — A Parallel Battlefield

While Italy's election has, for the moment, produced a clear result, France presents a parallel and in some respects more chronically unstable battlefield for the same underlying contest. The French Communist Party (PCF), like its Italian counterpart, emerged from the Second World War with enormous prestige derived from its role in the Resistance, and participated in French coalition governments in the immediate postwar period. In May 1947, in a sequence of events that mirrors, and indeed slightly preceded, the Italian case, the PCF was excluded from the French government a decision precipitated by PCF support for a wave of strikes that the government regarded as politically motivated rather than purely industrial in character.

Since its exclusion from government, the PCF which retains very substantial support among the French working class and controls, through its close relationship with the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), the largest French trade union confederation, significant industrial muscle has engaged in a pattern of major strikes that French governments and many outside observers regard as having a significant political dimension: an attempt to demonstrate the PCF's continued capacity to disrupt the functioning of the French economy and, by extension, the implementation of the Marshall Plan in France, even from outside government. A wave of major strikes in November and December 1947, involving the railways, coal mines, and other key sectors, brought France close to a level of disruption that some in the government characterised, at the time, in terms approaching insurrection, though the strikes were ultimately contained without the government falling.

As of mid-May 1948, the French political situation remains characterised by chronic instability a succession of short-lived coalition governments, reflecting the deep divisions within French politics not only between left and right but also over questions of colonial policy (with the wars in Indochina and tensions in North Africa representing significant and divisive issues for French governments of every composition) and over France's approach to the German question, discussed elsewhere in this guide. The PCF, while currently outside government, remains the largest single party in terms of vote share in recent elections, and the question of whether and how France can achieve the kind of political stability that would allow effective implementation of Marshall Plan assistance assistance on which French reconstruction, like that of Italy, substantially depends remains a live and pressing concern for French governments and for Washington alike.

IV. The Marshall Plan in Action

The European Recovery Program the Marshall Plan having been enacted by the US Congress in the spring of 1948 (the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, signed into law in early April), is, as of mid-May, entering its operational phase, with the Economic Cooperation Administration established to oversee the disbursement of assistance to participating European states, which have themselves, through the Committee of European Economic Co-operation (the body that will evolve into the Organisation for European Economic

Co-operation), been engaged in a process of coordinating their requests for assistance and, at least in principle, their broader economic policies.

The political significance of the Marshall Plan extends considerably beyond its economic content. By offering assistance on a multilateral, European-coordinated basis explicitly including the Western zones of occupied Germany, a point of considerable sensitivity given the wartime experiences of states such as France and the Benelux countries the Plan represents a deliberate attempt to bind the recovery of Western Europe's economies together, and to bind them, in turn, to the United States, in a manner intended to be both economically effective and politically durable. The Soviet rejection of the Plan, and its prohibition of participation by Eastern European states, has had the effect (whether intended by Washington from the outset or not) of giving concrete economic expression to the political division of Europe that other developments the Czechoslovak coup, the breakdown of the Allied Control Council in Germany have also been producing.

For Italy and France specifically, Marshall Plan assistance is widely regarded, including by their own governments, as essential to addressing the severe economic dislocations food shortages, industrial under-production, currency instability that have persisted since the end of the war and that have provided much of the social and economic context for the strength of communist and socialist movements in both countries. The political logic articulated by American officials, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, is that economic recovery and political stability are mutually reinforcing: that Marshall Plan assistance will reduce the social conditions on which communist political strength feeds, while the political stability resulting from outcomes such as the Italian election will, in turn, facilitate the effective use of that assistance.

V. Key Actors

The United States

American policy toward Western Europe in mid-1948 represents perhaps the most successfully integrated combination of economic, political, and covert instruments that Washington has yet deployed in the emerging Cold War: the Marshall Plan's economic assistance, the CIA's covert support for anti-communist parties and institutions (of which the Italian operation is an early and, from the American perspective, highly successful example), and public diplomacy emphasising the stakes of the choice facing European electorates, all deployed in a coordinated fashion. The Italian result is likely to reinforce confidence in this approach and to inform how it might be applied, with appropriate adaptation, to other contexts including France, where the underlying dynamics, while different in important respects, present analogous concerns.

The Vatican

The Catholic Church's role in the Italian election represents one of the most significant interventions by a religious institution in a democratic election of the period, and reflects Pope Pius XII's deep and longstanding anti-communism, reinforced by reports reaching Rome regarding the treatment of the Catholic Church in Eastern European states that have come under communist control, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The Church's organisational capacity its network of parishes, schools, and affiliated lay organisations represents a form of political infrastructure that has no real equivalent on the

communist side in Italy, and which Christian Democrat strategists regard as having been decisive to the scale of their victory.

The Italian Communist Party and the Soviet Union

The PCI's response to its electoral defeat acceptance of the result, at least for now, rather than extra-parliamentary action reflects both Togliatti's own strategic orientation (Togliatti having long favoured a path to power through electoral and parliamentary means, in line with the broader 'national roads to socialism' approach that had characterised communist strategy in several Western European countries in the immediate postwar period) and, very likely, signals or expectations from Moscow regarding the costs and risks of a more confrontational response in a country where, unlike in Eastern Europe, Soviet military power is not present to support such a course. The episode raises, without yet definitively answering, questions about the future strategic orientation of Western European communist parties operating in countries that will remain outside the Soviet sphere of direct control.

France's Fourth Republic Governments

The succession of French governments grappling with the PCF's extra-parliamentary strength, the demands of colonial conflicts in Indochina and elsewhere, and the requirements of Marshall Plan participation represents a case study in the challenges facing parliamentary democracies attempting to maintain stability while implementing far-reaching economic and foreign policy commitments challenges that, while less dramatically resolved (in either direction) than in Italy, are no less significant for the broader trajectory of Western Europe's political alignment.

VI. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- What lessons, if any, should be drawn from the Italian election regarding the broader contest for political influence in Western Europe, and how might approaches employed in Italy be adapted or might their limits become apparent in other contexts, including France?
- How should the Soviet Union and communist parties in Western Europe respond to the Italian result does it call for a reassessment of strategy, and if so, in what direction?
- What are the implications of continued instability in France whether arising from the PCF's industrial strength, from colonial policy disputes, or from the broader fragility of Fourth Republic coalition governments for the implementation of the Marshall Plan and for France's role in the broader Western consolidation discussed elsewhere in this guide, including the London Conference process on Germany?
- What is the relationship between developments in Western Europe's domestic politics and the broader trajectory of events in Germany, given that France's German policy is itself shaped by domestic political considerations including the PCF's position?

Crisis Eight: Korea A Peninsula Dividing in Two

I. Liberation and Occupation

Korea's situation in mid-1948 has its origins in the abrupt manner of its liberation from thirty-five years of Japanese colonial rule at the end of the Second World War. With Japan's

surrender in August 1945, Korea was occupied by Soviet forces in the north and American forces in the south, divided, for purely military and administrative convenience at the moment of Japan's surrender, along the 38th parallel of latitude – a line that was not intended, at the time it was drawn, to represent any kind of permanent political division, but which has, in the three years since, hardened into precisely that.

In the immediate aftermath of liberation, Korean political life – suppressed for decades under Japanese rule – re-emerged with considerable energy and diversity, including the brief proclamation of a 'People's Republic of Korea' by a coalition of left-leaning and centrist Korean political figures in September 1945, an entity that both the American and Soviet occupation authorities moved to suppress or marginalise, each in their own zone, in favour of structures more amenable to their respective influence.

Initial plans, agreed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945, envisioned a period of multilateral trusteeship for Korea, administered jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China, intended to prepare the country for eventual independence as a unified state. These plans proved deeply unpopular among Koreans across the political spectrum, who regarded any continuation of foreign administration – even framed as preparation for independence – as an unacceptable continuation of the colonial experience they had only just escaped, and the trusteeship proposal became, in the years that followed, a major point of domestic political contention, with conservative nationalist figures such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku leading opposition to it, even as a Joint Commission of American and Soviet representatives, established to implement the trusteeship framework, met intermittently and ultimately fruitlessly through 1946 and 1947, unable to agree on the composition of a provisional Korean government that would satisfy both occupying powers.

II. The Move to Separate Elections

With the Joint Commission process having demonstrably failed to produce agreement by late 1947, the United States referred the Korean question to the United Nations, where, in November 1947, the General Assembly adopted a resolution – over Soviet objections – calling for elections to be held throughout Korea, under the observation of a newly established UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), to choose representatives for a national assembly that would form a government and negotiate the withdrawal of occupying forces.

The Soviet Union rejected this resolution as an illegitimate intervention by the United Nations in a matter it regarded as falling within the purview of the wartime agreements on Korea (and, more fundamentally, reflecting a calculation that any UN-supervised process, given the composition of the UN at this time, would produce outcomes unfavourable to Soviet interests in Korea), and refused to permit UNTCOK to operate in the northern zone. Faced with this refusal, and after considerable internal debate – including within the UN itself, where a number of member states expressed reservations about proceeding with elections in only part of the country, given the obvious risk that doing so would simply formalise the peninsula's division – the decision was taken to proceed with elections in the southern zone alone.

III. The May 1948 Elections in the South

On 10th May 1948 just four days before the freeze date of this committee elections were held throughout the American-occupied southern zone of Korea, under UNTCOK observation, to choose the members of a Constituent National Assembly. These elections represent one of the most immediate and significant developments bearing on the Korean situation as the committee convenes, and delegates should treat them as a recent and highly consequential event whose full political consequences are still very much in the process of unfolding.

The elections were conducted amid significant controversy and, in some areas, violence. A substantial body of Korean political opinion in the south including figures such as Kim Ku, a veteran nationalist leader who had headed the Korean Provisional Government in exile during the colonial period, and who, despite his own strong anti-communist credentials, regarded separate elections in the south alone as tantamount to formalising the division of the country boycotted the elections, having travelled to Pyongyang in April 1948 in a final, ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to negotiate some form of unified approach with northern Korean political figures, including Kim Il Sung. In Jeju Island, opposition to the elections, combined with broader grievances against the American military government's administration of the island, erupted into an uprising in the weeks before the election that the American military government and Korean police forces responded to with considerable force an episode (the Jeju uprising) whose suppression would, in the months following the freeze date, escalate into one of the most violent episodes of the entire period, though as of mid-May 1948 it remains an ongoing and unresolved situation rather than a concluded one.

The elections themselves resulted in a strong showing for groups associated with Syngman Rhee, the prominent conservative nationalist leader who had returned to Korea in 1945 after decades spent largely in the United States cultivating relationships with American officials and lawmakers, and who has positioned himself, more consistently and effectively than any other Korean political figure, as the leader best placed to head an independent (if separate) South Korean state, a position reinforced by his uncompromising anti-communism and his extensive networks within the American political establishment.

IV. The Situation as of 14th May 1948

As the committee convenes, the newly elected Constituent National Assembly has not yet held its first session that session, at which Syngman Rhee will be elected as the Assembly's chairman, is scheduled to convene on 31st May 1948, just over two weeks after the freeze date. The Assembly's subsequent work the adoption of a constitution and the election of Rhee as the first President of a new Republic of Korea, to be formally inaugurated in August 1948 lies in the near future as of the freeze date, but has not yet occurred, leaving the precise institutional shape of the new southern state, while broadly anticipated, still formally undetermined.

In the northern zone, under Soviet occupation, the political structures that have developed since 1945 centred on Kim Il Sung, a Korean communist who had spent the war years partly in the Soviet Union and who returned to Korea under Soviet sponsorship in 1945 have proceeded along an essentially parallel track, with the establishment of a 'People's Committee' structure exercising governmental functions in the north since 1946, though the formal proclamation of a separate northern state the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will not occur until September 1948, several months after the freeze date, and is, as of

mid-May, understood to be a response to (and, in important respects, a mirror of) the process underway in the south rather than an independent initiative that preceded it.

The immediate consequence of the 10th May elections, as of the freeze date, is that the trajectory toward a permanently divided Korean peninsula each half developing separate governmental institutions, each claiming, at least in principle, to represent the whole of Korea, and each aligned with one of the two occupying powers has become considerably more concrete and difficult to reverse than it had been even a few months earlier, even though the formal proclamation of two separate states remains, as of 14th May, still in the future for both halves of the peninsula. The withdrawal of occupying forces which both the United States and the Soviet Union have, at various points, indicated a desire to accomplish, reflecting in part the costs of continued occupation and in part a recognition that prolonged foreign military presence carries its own political costs remains a live question, with the timing and conditions of any such withdrawal, on either side of the 38th parallel, a matter that will significantly shape the relative military balance between the two halves of Korea once it occurs.

V. Key Actors

Syngman Rhee and the Emerging South Korean Leadership

Rhee's political trajectory from exiled independence leader to the dominant figure in the elections of 10th May 1948 reflects both his own considerable political skill in cultivating American support and a broader alignment between his uncompromising anti-communist politics and the priorities of the American military government in the south, even though the relationship between Rhee and individual American officials has, at various points, been markedly uneasy, with American officials sometimes privately expressing reservations about Rhee's authoritarian tendencies and his apparent prioritisation of his own political position over broader nation-building considerations.

Kim Ku and the Boycotting Opposition

Kim Ku's decision to boycott the May elections, and his earlier journey to Pyongyang in a final attempt at unified negotiations, represent the position of a significant body of Korean nationalist opinion that, while sharing little ideological common ground with the communist movement in the north, regarded the formalisation of Korea's division a division imposed, in the first instance, by the convenience of the wartime occupation arrangements of two foreign powers as a betrayal of the aspirations for which the Korean independence movement had struggled for decades. Kim Ku's continued political activity in the south, despite his electoral boycott, represents an ongoing source of complexity in southern Korean politics as the new state's institutions take shape.

Kim Il Sung and the Northern Leadership

Kim Il Sung's position in the north, underpinned by Soviet sponsorship since his return to Korea in 1945, has, by mid-1948, become well established, with the People's Committee structures under his leadership functioning, in practice, as the government of the northern zone even in advance of the formal proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea later in 1948. The northern leadership's response to the southern elections of 10th May and the steps it will take in the following months to establish its own parallel state

structures represent a developing situation whose precise trajectory remains to be determined as of the freeze date.

The United States

American policy in Korea reflects a combination of genuine, if somewhat underdeveloped, interest in Korean self-government, broader Cold War considerations regarding the strategic value (or lack thereof) of the Korean peninsula, and the practical desire to extricate American forces from a costly and, in the assessment of some American military planners, strategically peripheral occupation commitment an assessment that sits in some tension with the political commitment the United States has, through its sponsorship of the UN-supervised elections and its relationship with Rhee, increasingly made to the viability of a separate South Korean state.

The Soviet Union

Soviet policy in Korea, having rejected the UN-supervised election process for the peninsula as a whole, has proceeded with the development of governmental structures in the north broadly in parallel with developments in the south, a pattern that, as of mid-May 1948, positions the Soviet Union to respond to the formal establishment of a southern state (anticipated for August 1948) with the formal establishment of its own sponsored state in the north, completing by the end of 1948 the institutional division of the peninsula that the events of 10th May 1948 have set firmly in motion.

VI. Open Questions Facing the Committee

- Given the outcome of the 10th May elections, what should the policy of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the broader international community be regarding the future of the Korean peninsula should efforts toward eventual reunification continue, and if so, on what basis?
- What are the implications of continued or accelerated withdrawal of occupying forces from either zone for the military balance between the two halves of the peninsula, and for the prospects of stability in the region?
- How does the Korean situation relate to the broader pattern of developments in East Asia, including the trajectory of the Chinese Civil War, given Korea's geographic proximity to and historical relationships with China?
- What is the significance of ongoing unrest, including the situation on Jeju Island, for the legitimacy and stability of the emerging governmental structures in the south, and how might the international community respond to reports of the methods being used to suppress such unrest?

A Guide for Delegates: Representing Your Nation

Walking into this committee, your first instinct might be to react to the crises in front of you. Resist that instinct. The delegates who make the greatest impact in this room will not simply be the ones who respond to the world as it is, but the ones who understand it deeply enough to shape what it becomes. This section offers a framework for doing exactly that.

Know Your Nation Before You Know the Crisis

Before you can meaningfully engage with any of the crises on this agenda, you must understand the country and, in many cases, the specific individual you are representing at a fundamental level. What does your nation produce, and what does it need? Who are your allies, and why? Who are your rivals, and what do they want from you? What does your government fear most, and what does it want most? These are not background questions they are the engine of every position you will take in this room.

A delegate representing the United States in May 1948 is not simply representing a rising superpower in the abstract. They are representing a government grappling with the implications of the Marshall Plan, a deteriorating position in China, an active civil war in Greece, a collapsing four-power administration in Germany, and an imminent decision on whether to recognise a new state in the Middle East all in an election year. The same depth of understanding applies to every other nation and individual at this table.

Understand Your Foreign Policy Posture

Every nation in 1948 sits somewhere on a spectrum between alignment with the emerging Western bloc, alignment with the Soviet bloc, and a still-undefined space that does not yet have the institutional shape it will later acquire as 'non-alignment', but which nonetheless exists in practice for many newly independent or uncommitted states.

Nations aligned with the Western powers must consider how their decisions play with their allies, with domestic public opinion, and with the broader project of economic recovery and containment that is taking shape. Nations aligned with the Soviet Union must weigh Moscow's expectations against their own national interests, which are not always identical. Newly independent states face a different challenge entirely: how to extract maximum benefit and security from a world in which great powers are beginning to take an interest in their allegiance, without being consumed by a rivalry not of their making.

Find Your Leverage

Every nation, no matter how small, has leverage in this room. The question is knowing what yours is and how to use it. A newly independent state might seem powerless next to the United States or the Soviet Union, but its geographic position, its vote at the United Nations, and the signal its alignment sends to other uncommitted nations may matter enormously. That is not nothing it is, in fact, quite a lot.

For the larger powers, leverage is more obvious but also more complicated to deploy. The United States has economic resources, emerging alliance structures, and a public increasingly attentive to the 'communist threat'. The Soviet Union has the prestige of being the first socialist state, ideological appeal to colonial and anti-imperial movements, and a powerful conventional military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. Britain and France retain extensive colonial networks and historical relationships, even as those relationships come under growing strain. Identify your leverage early, and use it strategically rather than desperately.

Think About What Peace Actually Means for Your Nation

This committee will, at various points, ask you to work toward stability and the resolution of crises. But before committing to that framing, ask yourself an honest question: does peace, right now, in May 1948, actually serve your national interest?

For some nations, the answer is clearly yes. An open war over Berlin would be catastrophic for everyone. A wider regional war in the Middle East could destabilise neighbouring states and draw in outside powers in unpredictable ways. In these cases, working toward resolution is also working toward national interest.

But for others, the calculation is more complicated. A government that has just achieved independence may not see the existing international order as one worth preserving. A state locked in an active territorial dispute may calculate that continued conflict, while costly, serves its claims better than a premature settlement. A government seeking concessions from a great-power patron may find that the leverage of an unresolved crisis is precisely what gives it bargaining power.

Be honest about this. Do not simply perform the language of peace if your nation's genuine interest lies elsewhere. The best delegates are the ones who represent their nations truthfully, engage with contradictions openly, and find paths toward resolution or escalation that reflect real interests rather than idealised ones.

Come Prepared to Grow

This is a Crisis Committee, which means the rules are different and the possibilities are broader than in a standard General Assembly simulation. Deals that could not be made in a formal setting can be explored here. Relationships that would be diplomatically awkward in public can be developed in private. Positions that seem fixed at the start of the committee may shift as new information arrives through crisis updates and they should.

A delegate who holds the same position at the end of committee as they did at the beginning has not truly engaged with the process they have merely performed it. Come in knowing your nation's starting position. But come in ready to think, ready to be surprised, and ready to find solutions that serve your country's genuine long-term interest rather than its short-term talking points.

Directives

Directives are the primary mechanism through which delegates influence the committee using their nation's resources. A directive is a formal written communication, drafted by a delegate, that outlines a specific action, decision, or recommendation that their government or the relevant department, agency, or military command should undertake.

Directives may be written individually or jointly. A **Joint Directive** is one submitted by two or more delegates acting together, typically representing aligned states or partners. For a joint directive to be considered valid, it must carry the signatures of all participating delegates involved in its creation and endorsement.

Directives will be accepted only during designated windows during committee, unless the Executive Board determines otherwise. All directives remain subject to EB discretion and to the judicious-use principle: the careless or needless deployment of resources particularly military force is strongly discouraged, and delegates are expected to take a firm and realistic view of what is plausible given their nation's actual capabilities in 1948.

Types of Directives

- **Military Operations** the deployment, repositioning, or use of armed forces. The EB expects delegates to take careful account of plausibility: troop numbers, logistics, equipment, and political consequences all matter.
- **Intelligence or Covert Operations** secret actions intended to gather information or shape the situation on the ground in ways that would be 'publicly frowned upon' if attributed. The scope of these operations is open to interpretation, but delegates are strongly advised to proofread such directives carefully to avoid loopholes that opposing delegations might exploit.
- **Internal Actions** any action taken within a delegate's own country, whether economic, political, social, or security-related. These, too, must be submitted as directives and remain subject to EB approval; the fact that an action is 'internal' does not guarantee it will pass.
- **Portfolio Requests** a specific category of covert directive used when a delegate requires particular information critical to their next course of action, obtained via their intelligence services or government agencies. The EB will not entertain portfolio requests for vague or unviable information.
- **Joint Operations (Joint Directives)** directives submitted by two or more delegates acting in concert, which may themselves be of a covert nature.
- **Understandings Between Factions or Nations** treaties, memoranda of understanding, and similar instruments signed between delegations.
- **Presidential or Official Statements** formal public statements issued on behalf of a head of state or government.
- **Overt Directives** public actions or official communications that are openly recognised by the committee and may shape inter-state perception, alliances, or negotiation dynamics.

Directive Format

All directives must be submitted in the following format. Directives that do not conform to this format may not be entertained by the Executive Board:

To: Head of State or Relevant Department
From: Delegate of (Country)
Covert or Overt Operation (one or the other, not both)
Joint or Solo
Primary Objective: The primary goal of this operation.
Secondary Objective (optional): A secondary goal, less important than the primary objective.
Mission Brief: A 4–5 line summary of the plan of action.
Plan of Action: A complete, detailed description of the steps to be taken.
Additional Information: Maps, diagrams, or any other information the EB should consider.
Signatories: All delegates endorsing this directive (for joint directives).

I would also want the delegates to understand the different ways a directive can pass or fail which are as follows:

1. **Passed with Outcome:** The directive is approved, and its effects are visible to the committee or the wider world through an update or change in the simulation.
2. **Passed without Outcome:** The directive is approved, but its implementation or results remain undisclosed to the committee, with no visible updates provided.
3. **Failed:** The directive is rejected, meaning it has no impact or resulting change within the simulation.

Fog of War

Delegates should note that crisis updates will largely be based on the directives received, but not every directive will be converted into a visible update. This reflects the principle of **Fog of War**: it is impossible to know the outcome of every action immediately, as success or

failure depends on a range of factors most importantly, timing, and the time required for actions to unfold.

Delegates should not expect every directive's status to be known throughout committee. Some directives will pass without this being reflected in an update, due to practical considerations; conversely, some failed directives will be revealed through updates specifically so that the delegates responsible understand the consequences of their actions.

International Law

This section is intended to guide delegates on international law and the forms it takes. It does not assume that this committee operates under any particular fixed legal regime; rather, delegates are asked to apply this framework sensibly, with reference to the actual state of international law and treaty membership as it stood in May 1948.

Where Does International Law Come From?

International law differs fundamentally from domestic law: there is no international parliament, no single legislative body, and no court whose jurisdiction is automatically binding on all states. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is generally treated as the most authoritative statement of the sources of international law. It identifies four categories:

- International conventions, treaties, and agreements documents recognised and ratified by the states in question. A distinction exists between signature (which commits a state not to undermine a treaty's purpose) and ratification (which makes the treaty legally binding on that state, typically following approval by its legislature).
- Customary international law practices that, through consistent and widespread state practice, have come to be regarded as legally binding even without being written into a treaty. Examples include the principle of non-refoulement (the prohibition on returning refugees to danger) and the long-standing principle of diplomatic immunity.
- General principles of law recognised by civilised nations broad legal principles common to national legal systems, used to fill gaps where treaty law and custom are silent.
- Judicial decisions and the writings of leading scholars used as a subsidiary means of determining the law, rather than as a primary source in their own right.

Delegates should be careful to consider whether their own nation is actually a party to a given convention or agreement before invoking it, since not all states had signed or ratified the same instruments as of 1948 the landscape of international law in this period is considerably less developed and less universal than it would later become.

Closing Note

This guide is, by design, an introduction not a conclusion. The world of May 1948 is dense, contradictory, and full of detail that no single document could capture. We expect every delegate to arrive having gone well beyond these pages: read about your country, your assigned individual, and the events described here from multiple perspectives. Come in informed, but come in curious. Good luck, and we look forward to seeing you in committee.